Numerous real-world systems, ranging from healthcare to energy grids, involve users competing for finite and potentially scarce resources.

Numerous real-world systems, ranging from healthcare to energy grids, involve users competing for finite and potentially scarce resources.

In online learning, a decision maker repeatedly selects one of a set of actions, with the goal of minimizing the overall loss incurred. Following the recent line of research on algorithms endowed with additional predictive features, we revisit this problem by allowing the decision maker to acquire additional information on the actions to be selected. In particular, we study the power of \emph{best-action queries}, which reveal beforehand the identity of the best action at a given time step. In practice, predictive features may be expensive, so we allow the decision maker to issue at most $k$ such queries.We establish tight bounds on the performance any algorithm can achieve when given access to $k$ best-action queries for different types of feedback models. In particular, we prove that in the full feedback model, $k$ queries are enough to achieve an optimal regret of $\Theta(\min\{\sqrt T, \frac{T}{k}\})$. This finding highlights the significant multiplicative advantage in the regret rate achievable with even a modest (sublinear) number $k \in \Omega(\sqrt{T})$ of queries. Additionally, we study the challenging setting in which the only available feedback is obtained during the time steps corresponding to the $k$ best-action queries.

We study online learning problems in which a decision maker has to take a sequence of decisions subject to $m$ long-term constraints. The goal of the decision maker is to maximize their total reward, while at the same time achieving small cumulative constraints violations across the $T$ rounds. We present the first best-of-both-world type algorithm for this general class of problems, with no-regret guarantees both in the case in which rewards and constraints are selected according to an unknown stochastic model, and in the case in which they are selected at each round by an adversary. Our algorithm is the first to provide guarantees in the adversarial setting with respect to the optimal fixed strategy that satisfies the long-term constraints. In particular, it guarantees a $\rho/(1+\rho)$ fraction of the optimal utility and sublinear regret, where $\rho$ is a feasibility parameter related to the existence of strictly feasible solutions. Our framework employs traditional regret minimizers as black-box components. Therefore, by instantiating it with an appropriate choice of regret minimizers it can handle both the full-feedback as well as the bandit-feedback setting. Moreover, it allows the decision maker to seamlessly handle scenarios with non-convex reward and constraints. We show how our framework may be applied in the context of budget-management mechanisms for repeated auctions in order to guarantee long-term constraints which are not packing (e.g., ROI constraints).

Whenever a binary classifier is used to provide decision support, it typically provides both a label prediction and a confidence value. Then, the decision maker is supposed to use the confidence value to calibrate how much to trust the prediction. In this context, it has been often argued that the confidence value should correspond to a well calibrated estimate of the probability that the predicted label matches the ground truth label. However, multiple lines of empirical evidence suggest that decision makers have difficulties at developing a good sense on when to trust a prediction using these confidence values. In this paper, our goal is first to understand why and then investigate how to construct more useful confidence values. We first argue that, for a broad class of utility functions, there exists data distributions for which a rational decision maker is, in general, unlikely to discover the optimal decision policy using the above confidence values--an optimal decision maker would need to sometimes place more (less) trust on predictions with lower (higher) confidence values. However, we then show that, if the confidence values satisfy a natural alignment property with respect to the decision maker's confidence on her own predictions, there always exists an optimal decision policy under which the level of trust the decision maker would need to place on predictions is monotone on the confidence values, facilitating its discoverability. Further, we show that multicalibration with respect to the decision maker's confidence on her own prediction is a sufficient condition for alignment. Experiments on a real AI-assisted decision making scenario where a classifier provides decision support to human decision makers validate our theoretical results and suggest that alignment may lead to better decisions.

A central problem in cognitive science and behavioural neuroscience as well as in machine learning and artificial intelligence research is to ascertain whether two or more decision makers---be they brains or algorithms---use the same strategy. Accuracy alone cannot distinguish between strategies: two systems may achieve similar accuracy with very different strategies. The need to differentiate beyond accuracy is particularly pressing if two systems are at or near ceiling performance, like Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and humans on visual object recognition. Here we introduce trial-by-trial error consistency, a quantitative analysis for measuring whether two decision making systems systematically make errors on the same inputs. Making consistent errors on a trial-by-trial basis is a necessary condition if we want to ascertain similar processing strategies between decision makers. Our analysis is applicable to compare algorithms with algorithms, humans with humans, and algorithms with humans. When applying error consistency to visual object recognition we obtain three main findings: (1.) Irrespective of architecture, CNNs are remarkably consistent with one another.

When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the underlying assessment rule is deliberately kept secret to avoid gaming and maintain competitive advantage. The resulting opacity forces the decision subjects to rely on incomplete information when making strategic feature modifications. We capture such settings as a game of Bayesian persuasion, in which the decision maker offers a form of recourse to the decision subject by providing them with an action recommendation (or signal) to incentivize them to modify their features in desirable ways. We show that when using persuasion, the decision maker and decision subject are never worse off in expectation, while the decision maker can be significantly better off. While the decision maker's problem of finding the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) signaling policy takes the form of optimization over infinitely many variables, we show that this optimization can be cast as a linear program over finitely-many regions of the space of possible assessment rules. While this reformulation simplifies the problem dramatically, solving the linear program requires reasoning about exponentially-many variables, even in relatively simple cases. Motivated by this observation, we provide a polynomial-time approximation scheme that recovers a near-optimal signaling policy. Finally, our numerical simulations on semi-synthetic data empirically demonstrate the benefits of using persuasion in the algorithmic recourse setting.

We consider the problem of active sequential hypothesis testing where a Bayesian decision maker must infer the true hypothesis from a set of hypotheses. The decision maker may choose for a set of actions, where the outcome of an action is corrupted by independent noise. In this paper we consider a special case where the decision maker has limited knowledge about the distribution of observations for each action, in that only a binary value is observed. Our objective is to infer the true hypothesis with low error, while minimizing the number of action sampled. Our main results include the derivation of a lower bound on sample size for our system under limited knowledge and the design of an active learning policy that matches this lower bound and outperforms similar known algorithms.

The Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB) framework highlights the trade-off between acquiring new knowledge (Exploration) and leveraging available knowledge (Exploitation). In the classical MAB problem, a decision maker must choose an arm at each time step, upon which she receives a reward. The decision maker's objective is to maximize her cumulative expected reward over the time horizon. The MAB problem has been studied extensively, specifically under the assumption of the arms' rewards distributions being stationary, or quasi-stationary, over time. We consider a variant of the MAB framework, which we termed Rotting Bandits, where each arm's expected reward decays as a function of the number of times it has been pulled. We are motivated by many real-world scenarios such as online advertising, content recommendation, crowdsourcing, and more. We present algorithms, accompanied by simulations, and derive theoretical guarantees.